When Do Firms Hire Lobbyists? The Organization of Lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission / John M. de Figueiredo, James J. Kim.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

de Figueiredo, John M.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Kim, James J.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w10553.

NBER working paper series no. w10553

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2004.

Summary:

This paper examines the explanatory power of transaction cost economics to explain vertical integration decisions for lobbying by firms. We examine 150 lobbying contacts at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on the issue of payphone compensation for dial-around calls. When firms lobby on topics that are highly firm-specific and prone to sensitive-information leakage, they are more likely to use employees to lobby the FCC. However, when topics arise that are more general to the industry and do not include sensitive information, firms are more likely to use outside counsel to lobby the FCC.

Notes:

Print version record

June 2004.