Do Foreigners Invest Less in Poorly Governed Firms? / Christian Leuz, Karl V. Lins, Francis E. Warnock.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Leuz, Christian.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Lins, Karl V.

Warnock, Francis E.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w12222.

NBER working paper series no. w12222

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2006.

Summary:

As domestic sources of outside finance are limited in many countries around the world, it is important to understand the factors that influence whether foreign outside investors provide capital to a country's firms. This study examines whether and why investor concern about corporate governance results in fewer foreign holdings. We use a comprehensive set of foreign holdings by U.S. investors as a proxy for foreign investment and analyze a sample of 4,411 firms from 29 emerging market and developed economies. We find that foreigners invest significantly less in firms that are poorly governed, i.e., firms that have ownership structures that are more conducive to outside investor expropriation. Interestingly, this finding is not simply a matter of a country's economic development but appears to be directly related to a country's information rules and legal institutions. We therefore argue that information problems faced by foreign investors play an important role in this result. Supporting this explanation, we show that foreign investment is lower in firms that appear to engage in more earnings management.

Notes:

Print version record

May 2006.