Competitive Equilibria With Limited Enforcement / Patrick J. Kehoe, Fabrizio Perri.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Kehoe, Patrick J.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Perri, Fabrizio.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w9077.

NBER working paper series no. w9077

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2002.

Summary:

This study demonstrates how constrained efficient allocations can arise endogenously as equilibria in an economy with a limited ability to enforce contracts and with private agents behaving competitively, taking a set of taxes as given. The taxes in this economy limit risk-sharing and arise in an equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments of sovereign nations. The equilibrium allocations depend on governments choosing to tax both the repayment of international debt and the income from capital investment in their countries.

Notes:

Print version record

July 2002.