1 option
Categorical Redistribution in Winner-Take-All Markets / Roland G. Fryer, Glenn C. Loury.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Fryer, Roland G.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w10104.
- NBER working paper series no. w10104
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2003.
- Summary:
- This paper constructs a simple model of pair-wise tournament competition to investigate categorical redistribution in winner-take-all markets. We consider two forms of redistribution: category-sighted, where employers are allowed to use categorical information in pursuit of their redistributive goals; and category-blind, where they are not. It is shown that the equilibrium category-sighted redistribution scheme involves a constant handicap given to agents in the disadvantaged category. Equilibrium category-blind redistribution creates a unique semi-separating equilibrium in which a large pool of contestants exerts zero effort, and this pool is increasing in the aggressiveness of the redistribution goal.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- November 2003.
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