Basel II: A Contracting Perspective / Edward J. Kane.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Kane, Edward J.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w12705.

NBER working paper series no. w12705

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Other Title:

Basel II

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2006.

Summary:

Financial safety nets are incomplete social contracts that assign responsibility to various economic sectors for preventing, detecting, and paying for potentially crippling losses at financial institutions. This paper uses the theories of incomplete contracts and sequential bargaining to interpret the Basel Accords as a framework for endlessly renegotiating minimal duties and standards of safety-net management across the community of nations. Modelling the stakes and stakeholders represented by different regulators helps us to understand that inconsistencies exist in prior understandings about the range of sectoral effects that the 2004 Basel II agreement might produce. The analysis seeks to explain why, in the U.S., attempting to resolve these inconsistencies has spawned an embarrassingly fractious debate and repeatedly pushed back Basel II's scheduled implementation.

Notes:

Print version record

November 2006.