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Bidder Discounts and Target Premia in Takeovers / Boyan Jovanovic, Serguey Braguinsky.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Jovanovic, Boyan.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w9009.
- NBER working paper series no. w9009
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2002.
- Summary:
- When a takeover is announced, the sum of the stock-market values of the firms involved often falls, and the value of the acquirer almost always does. Does this mean that takeovers do not raise the values of the firms involved? Not necessarily. We set up a model in which the equilibrium number of takeovers is constrained efficient. Yet, upon news of a takeover, a target's price rises, the bidder's price falls, and, most of the time the joint value of the target and acquirer also falls.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- June 2002.
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