Markets for Reputation: Evidence on Quality and Quantity in Academe / Daniel S. Hamermesh, Gerard A. Pfann.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Hamermesh, Daniel S.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Pfann, Gerard A.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w15527.

NBER working paper series no. w15527

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Other Title:

Markets for Reputation

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2009.

Summary:

We develop a theory of the market for individual reputation, an indicator of regard by one's peers and others. The central questions are: 1) Does the quantity of exposures raise reputation independent of their quality? and 2) Assuming that overall quality matters for reputation, does the quality of an individual's most important exposure have an extra effect on reputation? Using evidence for academic economists, we find that, conditional on its impact, the quantity of output has no or even a negative effect on each of a number of proxies for reputation, and very little evidence that a scholar's most influential work provides any extra enhancement of reputation. Quality ranking matters more than absolute quality. Data on mobility and salaries show, on the contrary, substantial positive effects of quantity, independent of quality. We test various explanations for the differences between the determinants of reputation and salary.

Notes:

Print version record

November 2009.