Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations / Luc Laeven, Ross Levine.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Laeven, Luc.

Contributor:

Levine, Ross.

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w12675.

NBER working paper series no. w12675

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2006.

Summary:

The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100 percent small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact, one-third of publicly listed firms in Europe have multiple large owners, and the market value of firms with multiple blockholders differs from firms with a single large owner and from widely-held firms. Moreover, the relationship between corporate valuations and the distribution of cash-flow rights across multiple large owners is consistent with the predictions of recent theoretical models.

Notes:

Print version record

November 2006.