1 option
Decentralized Matching with Aligned Preferences / Muriel Niederle, Leeat Yariv.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Niederle, Muriel.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w14840.
- NBER working paper series no. w14840
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2009.
- Summary:
- We study a simple model of a decentralized market game in which firms make directed offers to workers. We focus on markets in which agents have aligned preferences. When agents have complete information or when there are no frictions in the economy, there exists an equilibrium that yields the stable match. In the presence of market frictions and preference uncertainty, harsher assumptions on the richness of the economy have to be made in order for decentralized markets to generate stable outcomes in equilibrium.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- April 2009.
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