Agency Problems and the Fate of Capitalism / Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Morck, Randall.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Yeung, Bernard.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w16490.

NBER working paper series no. w16490

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2010.

Summary:

Economics has firms maximizing value and people maximizing utility, but firms are run by people. Agency theory concerns the mitigation of this internal contradiction in capitalism. Firms need charters, regulations and laws to restrain those entrusted with their governance, just as economies need constitutions and independent judiciaries to restrain those entrusted with government. Agency problems distort capital allocation if corporate insiders are inefficiently selected or incentivized, and this hampers economic growth absent a legal system with appropriate constraints. However, political economy problems and agency problems in corporations may reinforce each other, compromising the quality of both corporate governance and government.

Notes:

Print version record

October 2010.