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Matching Firms, Managers and Incentives / Oriana Bandiera, Andrea Prat, Luigi Guiso, Raffaella Sadun.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Bandiera, Oriana.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w16691.
- NBER working paper series no. w16691
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2011.
- Summary:
- We exploit a unique combination of administrative sources and survey data to study the match between firms and managers. The data includes manager characteristics, such as risk aversion and talent; firm characteristics, such as ownership; detailed measures of managerial practices relative to incentives, dismissals and promotions; and measurable outcomes, for the firm and for the manager. A parsimonious model of matching and incentive provision generates an array of implications that can be tested with our data. Our contribution is twofold. We disentangle the role of risk-aversion and talent in determining how firms select and motivate managers. In particular, risk-averse managers are matched with firms that offer low-powered contracts. We also show that empirical findings linking governance, incentives, and performance that are typically observed in isolation, can instead be interpreted within a simple unified matching framework.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- January 2011.
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