Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence / Stephen Coate, Timothy Besley.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Coate, Stephen.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Besley, Timothy.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w7579.

NBER working paper series no. w7579

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Nominations for office.

Public utilities--State supervision.

Public utilities.

Electric utilities--State supervision.

Electric utilities.

Independent regulatory commissions.

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Other Title:

Elected versus Appointed Regulators

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2000.

Cambridge, Massachusetts : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2000.

Summary:

This paper contrasts direct election with political appointment of regulators. When regulators are appointed, regulatory policy becomes bundled with other policy issues the appointing politicians are responsible for. Since regulatory issues are not salient for most voters, regulatory policy outcomes reflect the preferences of party elites and special interests. Direct election of regulators strengthens the power of voters by ensuring the salience of regulatory issues. Using panel data on regulatory outcomes from U.S. states, we find evidence in favor of the idea that elected states are more pro-consumer in their regulatory policies.

Notes:

Print version record

March 2000.