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Commercial Policy in a Predatory World / James E. Anderson.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Anderson, James E.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w12576.
- NBER working paper series no. w12576
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2006.
- Summary:
- Mutual causation of predation and trade induces novel effects of commercial policy in this paper. The model can explain trade volume responses to market widening initiatives that are otherwise puzzlingly 'too big' or 'too small'. Efficient commercial policy (broadly defined) depends crucially on the strength of enforcement. Externalities arising between traders are normally internalized by subsidizing (taxing) trade when enforcement is weak (strong). Efficient regional policy squeezes weak enforcement markets while subsidizing strong enforcement markets. Tolerance (intolerance) of smuggling is rational when enforcement is weak (strong).
- Notes:
- Print version record
- October 2006.
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