Political Market Structure / James E. Anderson, Thomas J. Prusa.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Anderson, James E.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Prusa, Thomas J.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w8371.

NBER working paper series no. w8371

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2001.

Summary:

Many political markets are essentially uncontested, in the sense that one candidate raises little (or no) money and consequently has little chance of election. This presents a puzzle in the presence of apparently low barriers to entry. Using a variant of Baron (1989) we provide a theory encompassing both contested and uncontested markets. The essential addition is the presence of fixed costs of campaigning. We show that these may be quite small and yet constitute decisive barriers to entry.

Notes:

Print version record

July 2001.