Multi-Issue Bargaining and Linked Agendas: Ricardo Revisited or No Pain No Gain / Ignatius J. Horstmann, James R. Markusen, Jack Robles.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Horstmann, Ignatius J.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Markusen, James R.

Robles, Jack.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w8347.

NBER working paper series no. w8347

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Other Title:

Multi-Issue Bargaining and Linked Agendas

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2001.

Summary:

There has been much discussion about what issues should be included in international 'trade' negotiations. Different countries, firms and activists groups have quite different views regarding which items should (or should not) be negotiated together. Proposals run the gamut from no linking to linking trade with investment, the environment, labor and human-rights codes. This paper provides a formal framework for analyzing these questions. It employs a two-country, two-issue bargaining model and contrasts outcomes when issues are negotiated separately and when they are linked in some form. A key concept is 'comparative interest', analogous to Ricardian comparative advantage. We provide general results and note, in particular, where a country can benefit by agreeing to include an agenda item for which, when viewed by itself, the country does not receive a positive payoff.

Notes:

Print version record

June 2001.