Tax Competition and Migration: The Race-to-the-Bottom Hypothesis Revisited / Assaf Razin, Efraim Sadka.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Razin, Assaf.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Sadka, Efraim.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w16670.

NBER working paper series no. w16670

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Other Title:

Tax Competition and Migration

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2011.

Summary:

Oates reminds us that tax competition among localities in the presence of capital mobility, may lead to inefficiently low tax rates (and benefits). In contrast, the Tiebout paradigm suggests that tax competition yields an efficient outcome, so that there are no gains from tax coordination. This paper demonstrates that when a group of host countries faces an upward supply of migrants, labor and capital income tax rate under competition are higher than under tax coordination, due to a fiscal externality.

Notes:

Print version record

January 2011.