Who Adjusts and When? On the Political Economy of Reforms / Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, Francesco Trebbi.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Alesina, Alberto.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Ardagna, Silvia.

Trebbi, Francesco.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w12049.

NBER working paper series no. w12049

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2006.

Summary:

Why do countries delay stabilizations of large and increasing budget deficits and inflation? And what explains the timing of reforms? We use the war of attrition model as a guidance for our empirical study on a vast sample of countries. We find that stabilizations are more likely to occur when time of crisis occur, at the beginning of term of office of a new government, in countries with "strong" governments (i.e. presidential systems and unified governments with a large majority of the party in office), and when the executive faces less constraints. The role of external inducements like IMF programs has at best a weak effect, but problem of reverse causality are possible.

Notes:

Print version record

February 2006.