Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments / Sylvain Chassang, Gerard Padro i Miquel, Erik Snowberg.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Chassang, Sylvain.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Miquel, Gerard Padro i.

Snowberg, Erik.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w16343.

NBER working paper series no. w16343

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Other Title:

Selective Trials

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2010.

Summary:

We study the design of randomized controlled experiments in environments where outcomes are significantly affected by unobserved effort decisions taken by the subjects(agents). While standard randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are internally consistent, the unobservability of effort provision compromises external validity. We approach trial design as a principal-agent problem and show that natural extensions of RCTs -which we call selective trials- can help improve the external validity of experiments. In particular, selective trials can disentangle the effects of treatment, effort, and the interaction of treatment and effort. Moreover, they can help experimenters identify when measured treatment effects are affected by erroneous beliefs and inappropriate effort provision.

Notes:

Print version record

September 2010.