Overcoming the common pool problem through voluntary cooperation: the rise and fall of a fishery cooperative / Robert T. Deacon, Dominic P. Parker, Christopher Costello.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Deacon, Robert T.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Parker, Dominic P.

Costello, Christopher.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w16339.

NBER working paper series no. w16339

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Other Title:

Overcoming the common pool problem through voluntary cooperation

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2010.

Summary:

We analyze a seldom used, but highly promising form of rights-based management over common pool resources that involves the self-selection of heterogeneous fishermen into sectors. The fishery management regime assigns one portion of an overall catch quota to a voluntary cooperative, with the remainder exploited as a commons by those choosing to fish independently. Data from an Alaska commercial salmon fishery confirm our model's key predictions, that the co-op would facilitate the consolidation of fishing effort, coordination of harvest activities, sharing of information and provision of shared infrastructure. We estimate that the resulting rent gains were at least 25%. A lawsuit filed by two disgruntled independents led to the co-op's demise, an outcome also predicted by our model. Our analysis provides guidance for designing fishery reform that leads to Pareto improvements for fishermen of all skill levels, which suggests a structure that enables reform without losers.

Notes:

Print version record

September 2010.