My Account Log in

1 option

Optimal Reserve Management and Sovereign Debt / Laura Alfaro, Fabio Kanczuk.

NBER Working papers Available online

View online
Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Alfaro, Laura.
Contributor:
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Kanczuk, Fabio.
Series:
Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w13216.
NBER working paper series no. w13216
Language:
English
Physical Description:
1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
Place of Publication:
Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007.
Summary:
To study the joint decision of holding sovereign debt and reserves, we construct a stochastic dynamic equilibrium model that incorporates willingness-to-pay incentive problems. In this setup, debt and assets are not perfect substitutes, as reserves can be used even after a country has defaulted. We calibrate the model to a sample of emerging markets. We obtain that the reserve accumulation does not play a quantitatively important role in this model. In fact, the optimal policy is not to hold reserves at all. This finding is robust to considering interest rate shocks, sudden stops, contingent reserves and reserve dependent output costs.
Notes:
Print version record
July 2007.

The Penn Libraries is committed to describing library materials using current, accurate, and responsible language. If you discover outdated or inaccurate language, please fill out this feedback form to report it and suggest alternative language.

Find

Home Release notes

My Account

Shelf Request an item Bookmarks Fines and fees Settings

Guides

Using the Find catalog Using Articles+ Using your account