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Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets / Michael Ostrovsky, Michael Schwarz.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Ostrovsky, Michael.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w13766.
- NBER working paper series no. w13766
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2008.
- Summary:
- This paper explores information disclosure in matching markets, e.g., the informativeness of transcripts given out by universities. We show that the same, "benchmark," amount of information is disclosed in essentially all equilibria. We then demonstrate that if universities disclose the benchmark amount of information, students and employers will not find it profitable to contract early; if they disclose more, unraveling will occur.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- January 2008.
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