My Account Log in

1 option

Liaisons Dangereuses: Increasing Connectivity, Risk Sharing, and Systemic Risk / Stefano Battiston, Domenico Delli Gatti, Mauro Gallegati, Bruce C. Greenwald, Joseph E. Stiglitz.

NBER Working papers Available online

View online
Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Battiston, Stefano.
Contributor:
Delli Gatti, Domenico.
Gallegati, Mauro.
Greenwald, Bruce C.
Stiglitz, Joseph E.
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series:
Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w15611.
NBER working paper series no. w15611
Language:
English
Physical Description:
1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
Other Title:
Liaisons Dangereuses
Place of Publication:
Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2009.
Summary:
We characterize the evolution over time of a network of credit relations among financial agents as a system of coupled stochastic processes. Each process describes the dynamics of individual financial robustness, while the coupling results from a network of liabilities among agents. The average level of risk diversification of the agents coincides with the density of links in the network. In addition to a process of diffusion of financial distress, we also consider a discrete process of default cascade, due to the re-evaluation of agents' assets. In this framework we investigate the probability of individual defaults as well as the probability of systemic default as a function of the network density. While it is usually thought that diversification of risk always leads to a more stable financial system, in our model a tension emerges between individual risk and systemic risk. As the number of counterparties in the credit network increases beyond a certain value, the default probability, both individual and systemic, starts to increase. This tension originates from the fact that agents are subject to a financial accelerator mechanism. In other words, individual financial fragility feeding back on itself may amplify the effect of an initial shock and lead to a full fledged systemic crisis. The results offer a simple possible explanation for the endogenous emergence of systemic risk in a credit network.
Notes:
January 2009.
Print version record

The Penn Libraries is committed to describing library materials using current, accurate, and responsible language. If you discover outdated or inaccurate language, please fill out this feedback form to report it and suggest alternative language.

My Account

Shelf Request an item Bookmarks Fines and fees Settings

Guides

Using the Library Catalog Using Articles+ Library Account