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Safety-Net Benefits Conferred on Difficult-to-Fail-and-Unwind Banks in the US and EU Before and During the Great Recession / Santiago Carbo-Valverde, Edward J. Kane, Francisco Rodriguez-Fernandez.

NBER Working papers Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Carbo-Valverde, Santiago.
Contributor:
Kane, Edward J.
Rodriguez-Fernandez, Francisco.
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series:
Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w16787.
NBER working paper series no. w16787
Language:
English
Physical Description:
1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
Place of Publication:
Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2011.
Summary:
This paper models and estimates ex ante safety-net benefits at a sample of large banks in US and Europe during 2003-2008. Our results suggest that difficult-to-fail and unwind (DFU) banks enjoyed substantially higher ex ante benefits than other institutions. Safety-net benefits prove significantly larger for DFU firms in Europe and bailout decisions less driven by asset size than in the US. We also find that a proxy for regulatory capture helps to explain bailout decisions in Europe. A policy implication of our findings is that authorities could better contain safety-net benefits if they refocused their information systems on measuring volatility as well as capital.
Notes:
February 2011.
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