"To Establish a More Effective Supervision of Banking": How the Birth of the Fed Altered Bank Supervision / Eugene N. White.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

White, Eugene N.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w16825.

NBER working paper series no. w16825

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Other Title:

To Establish a More Effective Supervision of Banking

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2011.

Summary:

Although bank supervision under the National Banking System exercised a light hand and panics were frequent, depositor losses were minimal. Double liability induced shareholders to carefully monitor bank managers and voluntarily liquidate banks early if they appeared to be in trouble. Inducing more disclosure, marking assets to market, and ensuring prompt closure of insolvent national banks, the Comptroller of the Currency reinforced market discipline. The arrival of the Federal Reserve weakened this regime. Monetary policy decisions conflicted with the goal of financial stability and created moral hazard. The appearance of the Fed as an additional supervisor led to more "competition in laxity" among regulators and "regulatory arbitrage" by banks. When the Great Depression hit, policy-induced deflation and asset price volatility were misdiagnosed as failures of competition and market valuation. In response, the New Deal shifted to a regime of discretion-based supervision with forbearance.

Notes:

Print version record

February 2011.