Indicator Variables for Optimal Policy under Asymmetric Information / Lars E.O. Svensson, Michael Woodford.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Svensson, Lars E.O.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Woodford, Michael.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w8255.

NBER working paper series no. w8255

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2001.

Summary:

The optimal weights on indicators in models with partial information about the state of the economy and forward-looking variables are derived and interpreted, both for equilibria under discretion and under commitment. The private sector is assumed to have information about the state of the economy that the policymaker does not possess. Certainty-equivalence is shown to apply, in the sense that optimal policy reactions to optimally estimated states of the economy are independent of the degree of uncertainty. The usual separation principle does not hold, since the estimation of the state of the economy is not independent of optimization and is in general quite complex. We present a general characterization of optimal filtering and control in settings of this kind, and discuss an application of our methods to the problem of the optimal use of 'real-time' macroeconomic data in the conduct of monetary policy.

Notes:

Print version record

April 2001.