1 option
Political Economy of Ramsey Taxation / Daron Acemoglu, Mikhail Golosov, Aleh Tsyvinski.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Acemoglu, Daron.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w15302.
- NBER working paper series no. w15302
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2009.
- Summary:
- We study the dynamic taxation of capital and labor in the Ramsey model under the assumption that taxes and public good provision are decided by a self-interested politician who cannot commit to policies. We show that, as long as the discount factor of the politician is equal to or greater than that of the citizens, the Chamley-Judd result of zero long-run taxes holds. In contrast, if the politician is less patient than the citizens, the best (subgame perfect) equilibrium from the viewpoint of the citizens involves long-run capital taxation.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- August 2009.
The Penn Libraries is committed to describing library materials using current, accurate, and responsible language. If you discover outdated or inaccurate language, please fill out this feedback form to report it and suggest alternative language.