Political Pressure Deflection / James E. Anderson, Maurizio Zanardi.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Anderson, James E.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Zanardi, Maurizio.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w10439.

NBER working paper series no. w10439

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2004.

Summary:

Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes --- political pressure deflection. Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to `sell' is valuable to politicians. The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence. U.S. trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example, especially antidumping law and its evolution.

Notes:

Print version record

April 2004.