Immigration and the Survival of Social Security: A Political Economy Model / Edith Sand, Assaf Razin.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Sand, Edith.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Razin, Assaf.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w12800.

NBER working paper series no. w12800

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Other Title:

Immigration and the Survival of Social Security

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2006.

Summary:

In the political debate people express the idea that immigrants are good because they can help pay for the old. The paper explores this idea in a dynamic political-economy setup. For this purpose we develop an OLG political economy model of social security and migration. We characterize sub-game perfect Markov equilibria where immigration policy and pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security system are jointly determined through a majority voting process. The main feature of the model is that immigrants are desirable for the sustainability of the social security system because the political system is able to manipulate the ratio of old to young and thereby the coalition which supports future high social security benefits. We demonstrate that the older is the native born population the more likely is that the immigration policy is liberalized and the social security system survives.

Notes:

Print version record

December 2006.