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The Regulation of Entry / Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio LopezdeSilanes, Andrei Shleifer.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Djankov, Simeon.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w7892.
- NBER working paper series no. w7892
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Informal sector (Economics)--Developing countries.
- Informal sector (Economics).
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2000.
- Cambridge, Massachussetts : National Bureau of Economic Research, [2000]
- Summary:
- We present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 75 countries. The data set contains information on the number of procedures, official time, and official cost that a start-up must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries with heavier regulation of entry have higher corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality of public or private goods. Countries with more democratic and limited governments have fewer entry regulations. The evidence is inconsistent with Pigouvian (helping hand) theories of benevolent regulation, but support the (grabbing hand) view that entry regulation benefits politicians and bureaucrats.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- September 2000.
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