A Case for Quantity Regulation / Edward L. Glaeser, Andrei Shleifer.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Glaeser, Edward L.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Shleifer, Andrei.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w8184.

NBER working paper series no. w8184

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2001.

Summary:

Contrary to the standard economic advice, many regulations of financial intermediaries, as well as other regulations such as blue laws, fishing rules, zoning restrictions, or pollution controls, take the form of quantity controls rather than taxes. We argue that costs of enforcement are crucial to understanding these choices. When violations of quantity regulations are cheaper to discover than failures to pay taxes, the former can emerge as the optimal instrument for the government, even when it is less attractive in the absence of enforcement costs. This analysis is especially relevant to situations where private enforcement of regulations is crucial.

Notes:

Print version record

March 2001.