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A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics / Gene M. Grossman, Elhanan Helpman.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Grossman, Gene M.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w11014.
- NBER working paper series no. w11014
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2004.
- Summary:
- We develop a novel model of campaigns, elections, and policymaking in which the ex ante objectives of national party leaders differ from the ex post objectives of elected legislators. This generates a distinction between "policy rhetoric" and "policy reality" and introduces an important role for "party discipline" in the policymaking process. We identify a protectionist bias in majoritarian politics. When trade policy is chosen by the majority delegation and legislators in the minority have limited means to influence choices, the parties announce trade policies that favor specific factors, and the expected tariff or export subsidy is positive. Positions and expected outcomes monotonically approach free trade as party discipline strengthens.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- December 2004.
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