The analysis of dual-credit regualtion based on the dynamic game theory Chongqing University

Format:

Book

Conference/Event

Author/Creator:

Pengyu, Chen, author.

Contributor:

Lin, Guan

Yin, Yunlei

Zhan, Zhenfei

Conference Name:

SAE WCX Digital Summit (2021-04-13 : Live Online, Pennsylvania, United States)

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource cm

Place of Publication:

Warrendale, PA SAE International 2021

Summary:

China's auto market has developed rapidly in recent years, and has become the world's largest auto market. The rapid increase in sales of passenger cars has brought a series of environmental and energy problems. In response to these problems,"The Parallel Management Method for Corporate Average Fuel Consumption and New Energy Vehicles Credits."（Dual-credit Regulation）has been enacted in 2018. However, some problems about the regulation gradually exposed with the NEV subsidies decreasing. To promote the development of NEV, the reform of dual credit regulation was issued in June,2020. This paper uses Cournot duopoly model to simulate the auto market and proposes a three-stage dynamic game approach with manufacturers and government. In this game, government first decides the dual-credit regulation and NEV subsidies, then manufacturers decide the optimal price and production volume of products. Some analyses of the dual-credit regulation are added and it provides some meaningful suggestions about the reform of dual credit regulation

Notes:

Vendor supplied data

Publisher Number:

2021-01-0787

Access Restriction:

Restricted for use by site license