Power over progress : how politics shape development finance in Africa / Keyi Tang.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Tang, Keyi, Author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Economic assistance--Corrupt practices--Africa.

Economic assistance.

Economic development--Corrupt practices--Africa.

Economic development.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xxiii, 222 pages) : digital, PDF file(s).

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2026.

Summary:

Why do some communities have access to roads and schools while others go without for decades? Keyi Tang's Power Over Progress investigates how external accountability and domestic political competition shape the allocation of fund in development finance across 48 African countries. While traditional donors attempt to curb favoritism through stricter conditions, their efforts are frequently undercut by domestic political incentives. Tang reveals how development finance from China, the World Bank, and Western donors often favors political power over need. She draws on newly geocoded data of subnational electoral results and development projects, alongside case studies of Zambia, Ethiopia, and Ghana, to explain how heightened political competition can intensify favoritism, diverting funds to strongholds or swing regions rather than the most underserved areas. Offering convincing data-driven analysis, Tang challenges conventional wisdom with crucial insights for rethinking development partnerships in the Global South.

Contents:

Cover

Half-title

Title page

Imprints page

Dedication

Epigraph

Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

Preface

Acknowledgments

List of Abbreviations

1 Introduction

1.1 Introduction

1.2 A Theory of the Distributive Politics of Development Finance

1.2.1 First Mechanism: External Accountability to Financiers in Project Identification Preparation

1.2.2 Second Mechanism: Domestic Political Competition

1.2.3 Third Mechanism: Subnational Political Importance for Incumbent Electoral Coalition

1.3 Empirical Strategy

1.3.1 Quantitative Analysis: Overview

1.3.2 Case Studies: Foreign-Financed Roads in Zambia, Ethiopia, and Ghana

1.4 This Book's Contribution

1.5 Structure of the Book

1.5.1 Chapter 2: Cross-Country Patterns in Subnational Allocation of Development Finance

1.5.2 Chapter 3: No Hyena Eats the Lion's Share: Centralized Rent Management and Subdued Regional Favoritism in Ethiopia

1.5.3 Chapter 4: An Ounce of Competition, a Pound of Gold: Short Time Horizon, Presidentialism, and Rampant Ethnic Favoritism in Zambia

1.5.4 Chapter 5: Ghana: Short Horizons, Decentralized Rent Management, and the Targeting of Swing Voters during Electoral Cycles

1.5.5 Chapter 6: Conclusion

2 Cross-Country Patterns in Subnational Allocation of Development Finance

2.1 Introduction

2.2 Data and Research Design of Cross-Country and Cross-Sector Analysis

2.3 Findings from Cross-Country and Cross-Sector Analysis

2.3.1 Do Coethnic Districts with Leaders Receive More Finance?

2.3.2 The Impacts of Electoral Strategic Importance and the Incumbent's Vote Share on Development Finance Allocation, with Specific Sectors Controlled

2.4 Conclusion

3 No Hyena Eats the Lion's Share: Centralized Rent Management and Subdued Regional Favoritism in Ethiopia

3.1 Introduction.

3.2 Background of Ethiopia's Political System

3.2.1 A Brief Overview of Political Competition and Ethnic Groups in Ethiopia

3.2.2 Overview of Ethiopia's Road Sector

3.3 Empirical Evidence: Distributive Politics in the Allocation of Roads

3.3.1 The Timing of Aggregate Development Finance Inflow: Little Consistency with Electoral Cycles

3.3.2 The Location of Foreign-Financed Roads: Little Evidence of Regional Favoritism and More Alignment with the Long-Term Development Goal

3.4 Conclusion

4 An Ounce of Competition, a Pound of Gold: Short Time Horizon, Presidentialism, and Rampant Ethnic Favoritism in Zambia

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Background of Zambia's Political System

4.2.1 A Brief Overview of Ethnic Groups and Political Competition in Zambia

4.2.2 A Brief Overview of Zambia's Road Sector

4.3 Empirical Evidence: Distributive Politics in the Allocation of Roads

4.3.1 The Colonial State and the First Republic of Zambia (1964-1972): Development Finance Allocation Following the Mine-Port Pattern

4.3.2 The One-Party State (1972-1991): Little Political Competition and Relatively Even Distribution of Limited Development Finance

4.3.3 The MMD Government (1991-2011): Increased Political Competition and Emerging Favoritism

4.3.4 PF Government (2011-2021): Rampant Ethnic Favoritism and Corruption Exacerbated

4.4 Conclusion

5 Ghana: Short Horizons, Decentralized Rent Management, and the Targeting of Swing Voters during Electoral Cycles

5.1 Introduction

5.2 Background of Ghana's Political System

5.2.1 A Brief Overview of Political Competition and Elite Groups in Ghana

5.2.2 Overview of Ghana's Road Sector

5.3 Empirical Evidence: Distributive Politics in Road Allocation

5.3.1 Ghana's Public Resource Allocation Process

5.3.2 Political Cycles of Aggregate Development Finance Inflow.

5.3.3 Per Capita Subnational Allocation of Development Finance: Prioritizing Broad-Based Swing Regions over Party Strongholds

5.3.4 Problem with the Political Cycles of Resource Allocation

5.4 Conclusion

6 Conclusion

6.1 Summary of the Findings

6.2 Implications for Foreign Aid and Economic Development

6.3 Implications for the Political Economy of Development in Africa

6.4 Implications for China's Role in Global Public Goods Provision

6.5 Policy Implications

6.6 Concluding Reflections

Appendices

Appendix A Sources of Election Data

Appendix B Data Used for Currency Conversion

B.1 US Consumer Price Index (CPI) by Year

B.2 USD to Ethiopian Birr (ETB) Exchange Rates by Year (1 USD = X ETB)

B.3 USD to Zambian Kwacha (ZMW) Exchange Rates by Year (1 USD = X ZMW)

B.4 Yearly USD to Ghanaian Cedi (GHS) Exchange Rate (2002-2021) (1 USD = X GHS)

Appendix C Raw Road Project Data Collected from Ethiopia, Zambia, and Ghana

C.1 Ethiopia's Road Projects Financed by Foreign Financiers (1997-2021)

C.2 Zambia's Road Budget from Foreign Financiers by Subnational Regions (2006-2021)

C.3 Ghana Road Projects Funded by Foreign Financiers (2002-2021)

Bibliography

Index.

Notes:

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 16 Mar 2026).

ISBN:

1-009-73217-X

1-009-73215-3

1-009-73214-5

OCLC:

1570890304