Varieties of Affect / Claire Armon-Jones.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Armon-Jones, Claire, author.

Series:

Toronto studies in philosophy ; 2.

Heritage

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Emotions (Philosophy).

Physical Description:

1 online resource (193 pages).

Place of Publication:

Toronto : University of Toronto Press, [2019]

Language Note:

In English.

Summary:

In this new and original book, Claire Armon-Jones examines the concept of affect and various philosophical positions which attempt to define and characterize it: the standard view, the neo-cognitivist view, and the objectual thesis. She contends that these views radically distort our understanding of affect by disregarding modes of affect which fail to conform to the accounts they each employ. Against the standard and neo-cognitivist views she argues that the notions they use to characterize affect are neither necessary nor sufficient; and against the objectual thesis she further argues that affective states exhibit degrees of independence from the concept of an object. She develops a new theory of the varieties of affect that explains their cognitive nature, their felt aspect, their special logic and the relationship between their objectless and object-directed forms. Armon-Jones concludes by suggesting that her arguments call into question certain assumptions about the rationality and moral status of affect and require a revision of the conception of the good in affect.

Contents:

Frontmatter

CONTENTS

PREFACE

CHAPTER ONE. CHARACTERIZING EMOTIONS: AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW

CHAPTER TWO. CRITIQUE OF THE OBJECTUAL VIEW

CHAPTER THREE. AFFECTIVE FRAMES OF MIND

CHAPTER FOUR. AFFECTIVE DISPOSITIONS

CHAPTER FIVE. EXPLAINING AFFECTIVE LIFE

REFERENCES

SUBJECT INDEX

NAME INDEX

Notes:

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 22. Okt 2019)

A Revision of the author's thesis (doctoral)--University of Oxford, 1990.

ISBN:

1-4875-7188-7

OCLC:

1125189134