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A course in microeconomic theory / David M. Kreps.
De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook Package Archive 1927-1999 Available online
De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook Package Archive 1927-1999- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Kreps, David M., author.
- Series:
- Princeton scholarship online.
- Princeton scholarship online
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Microeconomics.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (xviii, 850 pages) : illustrations
- Edition:
- New edition.
- Place of Publication:
- Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 2021 c1990
- Summary:
- 'A Course in Microeconomic Theory' is a text in microeconomics that is both challenging and 'user-friendly.' The work is designed for the first-year graduate microeconomic theory course and is accessible to advanced undergraduates as well. Placing unusual emphasis on modern noncooperative game theory, it provides the student and instructor with a unified treatment of modern microeconomic theory - one that stresses the behavior of the individual actor (consumer or firm) in various institutional settings. The author has taken special pains to explore the fundamental assumptions of the theories and techniques studied, pointing out both strengths and weaknesses.
- Contents:
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Chapter One: An overview
- Chapter Two: The theory of consumer choice and demand
- Chapter Three: Choice under uncertainty
- Chapter Four: Dynamic choice
- Chapter Five: Social choice and efficiency
- Chapter Six: Pure exchange and general equilibrium
- Chapter Seven: The neoclassical firm
- Chapter Eight: The competitive firm and perfect competition
- Chapter Nine: Monopoly
- Chapter Ten: Imperfect competition
- Chapter Eleven: Modeling competitive situations
- Chapter Twelve: Solution concepts for noncooperative games
- Chapter Thirteen: Incomplete information and irrationality
- Chapter Fourteen: Repeated play: Cooperation and reputation
- Chapter Fifteen: Bilateral bargaining
- Chapter Sixteen: Moral hazard and incentives
- Chapter Seventeen: Adverse selection and market signaling
- Chapter Eighteen: The revelation principle and mechanism design
- Chapter Nineteen: Theories of the firm
- Chapter Twenty: Transaction cost economics and the firm
- Postscript
- Appendix One: Constrained optimization
- Appendix Two: Dynamic programming
- Index
- Notes:
- Previously issued in print: 2020.
- Includes bibliographical references and index.
- Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on May 5, 2021).
- ISBN:
- 9780691215747
- 069121574X
- OCLC:
- 1227052011
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