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Individual Strategy and Social Structure An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions / H. Peyton Young.

De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook Package Archive 1927-1999 Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Young, H. Peyton., Author.
Series:
Princeton paperbacks
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Social institutions.
Institutional economics.
Game theory.
Evolutionary economics.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (208 pages)
Edition:
2. print., 1. pbk. print.
Manufacture:
Baltimore, Md. : Project MUSE, 2021
Place of Publication:
Princeton, NJ : Princeton Univ. Press, 2001.
Summary:
Neoclassical economics as-sumes that people are highly rational and can reason their way through even the most complex economic problems. In Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Peyton Young argues for a more realistic view in which people have a limited understanding of their environment, are sometimes short-sighted, and occasionally act in perverse ways. He shows how the cumulative experiences of many such individuals coalesce over time into customs, norms, and institutions that govern economic and social life. He develops a theory that predicts how such institutions evolve and characterizes their welfare properties. The ideas are illustrated through a variety of examples, including patterns of residential segregation, rules of the road, claims on property, forms of economic contracts, and norms of equity. The book relies on new results in evolutionary game theory and stochastic dynamical systems theory, many of them originated by the author. It can serve as an introductory text, or be read on its own as a contribution to the study of economic and social institutions.
Contents:
Frontmatter
CONTENTS
PREFACE
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Chapter 1. OVERVIEW
Chapter 2. LEARNING
Chapter 3. DYNAMIC AND STOCHASTIC STABILITY
Chapter 4. ADAPTIVE LEARNING IN SMALL GAMES
Chapter 5. VARIATIONS ON THE LEARNING PROCESS
Chapter 6 LOCAL INTERACTION
Chapter 7. EQUILIBRIUM AND DISEQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GENERAL GAMES
Chapter 8. BARGAINING
Chapter 9. CONTRACTS
Chapter 10. CONCLUSION
Appendix. PROOFS OF SELECTED THEOREMS
NOTES
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
Notes:
Description based on print version record.
ISBN:
9780691214252
0691214255
OCLC:
1227051210

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