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A mathematical theory of evidence / Glenn Shafer.

De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook Package Archive 1927-1999 Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Shafer, Glenn, 1946- author.
Contributor:
Dempster, A. P., Contributor.
Shafer, Glenn, Contributor.
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Probabilities.
Mathematical statistics.
Evidence.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (xiii, 297 pages)
Place of Publication:
Princeton, New Jersey ; London : Princeton University Press, [1976]
Summary:
Both in science and in practical affairs we reason by combining facts only inconclusively supported by evidence. Building on an abstract understanding of this process of combination, this book constructs a new theory of epistemic probability. The theory draws on the work of A. P. Dempster but diverges from Depster's viewpoint by identifying his "lower probabilities" as epistemic probabilities and taking his rule for combining "upper and lower probabilities" as fundamental. The book opens with a critique of the well-known Bayesian theory of epistemic probability. It then proceeds to develop an alternative to the additive set functions and the rule of conditioning of the Bayesian theory: set functions that need only be what Choquet called "monotone of order of infinity." and Dempster's rule for combining such set functions. This rule, together with the idea of "weights of evidence," leads to both an extensive new theory and a better understanding of the Bayesian theory. The book concludes with a brief treatment of statistical inference and a discussion of the limitations of epistemic probability. Appendices contain mathematical proofs, which are relatively elementary and seldom depend on mathematics more advanced that the binomial theorem.
Contents:
Frontmatter
FOREWORD
PREFACE
CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 2. DEGREES OF BELIEF
CHAPTER 3. DEMPSTER'S RULE OF COMBINATION
CHAPTER 4. SIMPLE AND SEPARABLE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS
CHAPTER 5. THE WEIGHTS OF EVIDENCE
CHAPTER 6. COMPATIBLE FRAMES OF DISCERNMENT
CHAPTER 7. SUPPORT FUNCTIONS
CHAPTER 8. THE DISCERNMENT OF EVIDENCE
CHAPTER 9. QUASI SUPPORT FUNCTIONS
CHAPTER 10. CONSONANCE
CHAPTER 11. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE
CHAPTER 12. THE DUAL NATURE OF PROBABLE REASONING
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
Notes:
Description based on print version record.
Includes bibliographical references pages 287-291 and index.
ISBN:
9780691214696
0691214697
OCLC:
1248759935

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