Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World / Wesley C. Salmon.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Salmon, Wesley C.

Contributor:

Princeton University Press., Publisher.

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource

Place of Publication:

Princeton : Princeton University Press, [post 2005], 1984.

Language Note:

In English.

Summary:

The philosophical theory of scientific explanation proposed here involves a radically new treatment of causality that accords with the pervasively statistical character of contemporary science. Wesley C. Salmon describes three fundamental conceptions of scientific explanation--the epistemic, modal, and ontic. He argues that the prevailing view (a version of the epistemic conception) is untenable and that the modal conception is scientifically out-dated. Significantly revising aspects of his earlier work, he defends a causal/mechanical theory that is a version of the ontic conception. Professor Salmon's theory furnishes a robust argument for scientific realism akin to the argument that convinced twentieth-century physical scientists of the existence of atoms and molecules. To do justice to such notions as irreducibly statistical laws and statistical explanation, he offers a novel account of physical randomness. The transition from the "reviewed view" of scientific explanation (that explanations are arguments) to the causal/mechanical model requires fundamental rethinking of basic explanatory concepts.

Contents:

Frontmatter

Contents

Preface

Acknowledgments

1. Scientific Explanation: Three General Conceptions

Introduction

Explanation versus Description

Other Types of Explanation

Laplacian Explanation

Three Basic Conceptions

An Outline of Strategy

2. Statistical Explanation and Its Models

Inductive-Statistical Explanation

The Statistical-Relevance Approach

3. Objective Homogeneity

Epistemic Relativization

Randomness

Homogeneity

Some Philosophical Applications

Some Philosophical Reflections

4. The Three Conceptions Revisited

The Epistemic Conception

The Modal Conception

The Ontic Conception

How These Conceptions Answer a Fundamental Question

Conclusions

5. Causal Connections

Basic Problems

Two Basic Concepts

Processes

The 'At-At' Theory of Causal Propagation

6. Causal Forks and Common Causes

Conjunctive Forks

Interactive Forks

Relations between Conjunctive and Interactive Forks

Perfect Forks

The Causal Structure of the World

Concluding Remarks

7. Probabilistic Causality

The Sufficiency/Necessity View

Statistical Relevance and Probabilistic Causality

Causality and Positive Relevance

Causal Processes and Propensities

8. Theoretical Explanation

Causal Connections and Common Causes

Explanatory versus Inferential Principles

The Common Cause Principle and Molecular Reality

The Explanatory Power of Theories

Empiricism and Realism

9. The Mechanical Philosophy

Logic versus Mechanisms

Explanation in Quantum Mechanics

Explanation and Understanding

The Causal/Mechanical Model

The Final Contrast

Bibliography

Index

Notes:

Na dok. data wyd. 1984, prawdopodobna data wyd. po 2005 r. ustalona na podstawie 13-cyfrowego ISBN.

Includes bibliographical references (pages [280]-293) and index.

Description based on print version record.

ISBN:

9780691101705

0691101701

OCLC:

1229161372