Unelected Power : The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State / Paul Tucker.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Tucker, Paul M. W., 1958- author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Banks and banking--State supervision.

Banks and banking.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (663 pages)

Place of Publication:

Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, [2019]

Language Note:

In English.

Summary:

How central banks and independent regulators can support rather than challenge constitutional democracyUnelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers and other independent regulators act as stewards of the common good. Blending economics, political theory, and public law, this critically important book explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate in the eyes of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. It explains why the solution must fit with how real-world government is structured, and why technocrats and their political overseers need incentives to make the system work as intended. Now with a new preface by Paul Tucker, Unelected Power explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint.

Contents:

Frontmatter

Contents

Preface to the Paperback

Preface

1. Introduction: Power, Welfare, Incentives, Values

PART I. Welfare: THE PROBLEM, AND A POSSIBLE SOLUTION

2. The Evolution of the Administrative State

3. The Purposes and Functional Modes of the Administrative State

4. The Structure of the Administrative State

5. Principles for Whether to Delegate to Independent Agencies

6. Design Precepts for How to Delegate to Independent Agencies

7. Applying the Principles for Delegation

PART II. Values: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY FOR INDEPENDENT AGENCIES

8. Independent Agencies and Our Political Values and Beliefs (1)

9. Independent Agencies and Our Political Values and Beliefs (2)

10. Credible Commitment versus Democracy

11. The Political- Values- and- Norms Robustness Test of the Principles for Delegation

12. Insulated Agencies and Constitutionalism

PART III. Incentives: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IN THE REAL WORLD: INCENTIVES AND VALUES UNDER DIFFERENT CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES

13. States' Capacity for Principled Delegation to Deliver Credible Commitment

14. The Problem of Vague Objectives

15. Processes, Transparency, and Accountability

16. The Limits of Design

PART IV. Power: Overmighty Citizens? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CENTRAL BANKING: POWER, LEGITIMACY, AND RECONSTRUCTION

17. Central Banking and the Politics of Monetary Policy

18. The Shift in Ideas

19. Tempting the Gods

20. A Money-Credit Constitution

21. Central Banking and the Regulatory State

22. Central Banking and the Fiscal State

23. Central Banks and the Emergency State

24. Overmighty Citizens After All?

Conclusion. Unelected Democrats

APPENDIX

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INDEX

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 22. Okt 2019)

ISBN:

9780691196985

0691196982

OCLC:

1111951009