Self-policing in politics : the political economy of reputational controls on politicians / Glenn R. Parker.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Parker, Glenn R., 1946- author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Political corruption--Economic aspects.

Political corruption.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (198 pages) : illustrations

Place of Publication:

Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press, [2004]

Summary:

Contrary to what news reports might suggest, the majority of politicians behave ethically and are never subject to investigations. Is this because of the elaborate system of rules Congress has constructed to regulate the conduct of its members as well as the fear of electoral reprisal? Drawing on economic literature on the behavior of firms, Glenn Parker answers no. He argues that members of Congress behave ethnically not because of the fear of punishment but because of their concern for their reputations. He draws parallels between politicians and businesses, since both stand to suffer significantly when accused of wrongdoing. Just as business' poor behavior can cause brand names to be tarnished, prices to plummet, and future business to disappear, dishonest politicians stand to sacrifice the human capital invested in their careers, and premiums for honesty, such as electoral security and prestigious post-elective employment. Parker explores public attitudes toward the behavior of members of Congress and shows how those attitudes shape the way members conduct their professional lives. Written from the perspective of public choice, this book offers a novel approach to the question of how to keep politicians honest.

Contents:

Frontmatter

Contents

List of Figures and Tables

Acknowledgments

Introduction

CHAPTER 1 What Is Opportunism and How Do We Control It?

CHAPTER 2 How Reputations Control Cheating in Economics and Politics

CHAPTER 3 Problems in the Market for Legislators

CHAPTER 4 Hypotheses, Measurement, and Data

CHAPTER 5 Constraining Opportunism through Self-Policing

CHAPTER 6 Reputational Capital and Job Security; or, If Trustworthy Legislators Are at a Premium, Are They Paid One?

CHAPTER 7 Weaknesses in Reputational Controls In

Conclusion

APPENDIX 1 Most Important Characteristic for Legislator to Possess: Examples of Category Content

APPENDIX 2 Examples of Categories of Employment

APPENDIX 3 Codes for Identifying Faithful Agents

APPENDIX 4 Lifetime Judicial Appointments: 1965–1996

APPENDIX 5 Examples of Prestigious Post-Elective Employment Positions

APPENDIX 6 Electoral Defeat and Post-Elective Employment for Senators in the Analysis

Notes

References

Name Index

Subject Index

Notes:

Description based on print version record.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

9780691117393

069111739X

OCLC:

1200556195