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Partisan balance : why political parties don't kill the U.S. Constitutional system / David R. Mayhew.

De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013 Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Mayhew, David R.
Series:
Princeton Lectures in Politics and Public Affairs
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Executive-legislative relations--United States.
Executive-legislative relations.
Political parties--United States.
Political parties.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (241 p.)
Edition:
Course Book
Place of Publication:
Princeton : Princeton University Press, c2011.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
With three independent branches, a legislature divided into two houses, and many diverse constituencies, it is remarkable that the federal government does not collapse in permanent deadlock. Yet, this system of government has functioned for well over two centuries, even through such heated partisan conflicts as the national health-care showdown and Supreme Court nominations. In Partisan Balance, noted political scholar David Mayhew examines the unique electoral foundations of the presidency, Senate, and House of Representatives in order to provide a fresh understanding for the government's success and longstanding vitality. Focusing on the period after World War II, and the fate of legislative proposals offered by presidents from Harry Truman to George W. Bush, Mayhew reveals that the presidency, Senate, and House rest on surprisingly similar electoral bases, with little difference in their partisan textures as indexed by the presidential popular vote cast in the various constituencies. Both congressional chambers have tilted a bit Republican, and while White House legislative initiatives have fared accordingly, Mayhew shows that presidents have done relatively well in getting their major proposals enacted. Over the long haul, the Senate has not proven much more of a stumbling block than the House. Arguing that the system has developed a self-correcting impulse that leads each branch to pull back when it deviates too much from other branches, Mayhew contends that majoritarianism largely characterizes the American system. The wishes of the majority tend to nudge institutions back toward the median voter, as in the instances of legislative districting, House procedural reforms, and term limits for presidents and legislators.
Contents:
The electoral bases
President and Congress
House and Senate I
House and Senate II
Reform
Appendix : sources for Presidential proposals.
Notes:
Description based upon print version of record.
Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 23. Mai 2019)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN:
9786612976452
9781282976450
1282976451
9781400838417
140083841X
OCLC:
705944525

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