Emotion, Cognition, and the Virtue of Flexibility / Isabel Kaeslin.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Kaeslin, Isabel, author.

Series:

Practical philosophy ; Volume 26.

Practical Philosophy Series ; Volume 26

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Emotions (Philosophy).

Physical Description:

1 online resource (188 pages)

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Berlin, Germany : Walter de Gruyter GmbH, [2023]

Summary:

Should emotions play a role in our decisions, even if they are "just feelings" and not necessarily "imbued with reason" or cognitively penetrated? The author shows that such basic feelings as aversion and attraction can be important normative guides by disrupting engrained habits and beliefs, enabling us to reconsider our ways, which is important due to the ever-changing nature of ethical demands on us. Therefore, these feelings should guide our decisions, even if they are not cognitive. This book fi lls a gap in the philosophy of emotions, ethics, and virtue epistemology.

Contents:

Intro

Acknowledgments

Contents

Introduction

Chapter 1: Emotional Response as a Normative Guide

Chapter 2: Feeling States and Cognitive States

Chapter 3: Against the Identification of Normativity with Rationality

Chapter 4: The Virtue of Flexibility and the Unity of Feeling and Cognitive Capacities

Chapter 5: Spontaneous Aversion and Attraction in "Good Thinking"

Conclusion

Bibliography

Index.

Notes:

Description based on print version record.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

3-11-078093-3