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Fault-tracing: against Quine-Duhem : a defense of the objectivity of scientific justification / Sam Mitchell.

De Gruyter DG Plus DeG Package 2020 Part 1 Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Mitchell, Sam, author.
Series:
Epistemische Studien (Frankfurt am Main, Germany) ; Volume 40.
Epistemic Studies ; Volume 40
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Duhem, Pierre Maurice Marie, 1861-1916.
Duhem, Pierre Maurice Marie.
Knowledge, Theory of.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (VIII, 224 p.)
Place of Publication:
Berlin ; Boston : De Gruyter, [2020]
Language Note:
In English.
Summary:
It is widely believed in philosophy of science that nobody can claim that any verdict of science is forced upon us by the effects of a physical world upon our sense organs and instruments. The Quine-Duhem problem supposedly allows us to resist any conclusion. Views on language aside, Quine is supposed to have shown this decisively. But it is just false. In many scientific examples, there is simply no room to doubt that a particular hypothesis is responsible for a refutation or established by the observations. Fault Tracing shows how to play independently established hypotheses against each other to determine whether an arbitrary hypothesis needs to be altered in the light of (apparently) refuting evidence. It analyses real examples from natural science, as well as simpler cases. It argues that, when scientific theories have a structure that prevents them from using this method, the theory looks wrong, and is subject to serious criticism. This is a new, and potentially far-reaching, theory of empirical justification.
Contents:
Frontmatter
Contents
Introduction
1. An Example of a Constructive Tree in Darwin
2. The Meaning of Independent Confirmation
3. How to Confirm Hypotheses about Unobservables
4. Fault Tracing
5. Examples of Fault Tracing
6. Chang’s Paradox
7. Escaping Cycles of Confirmation
8. The Theory-Ladenness of Observation
9. Cycles of Observations
10. Van Fraassen’s Paradox 10.1515/9783110685046-011
11. Human Values Are Irrelevant to Empirical Justification
12. From Constructivism to Metaphysics: Potential Applications
Bibliography
Name Index
Subject Index
Notes:
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Description based on print version record.
ISBN:
3-11-068504-3
OCLC:
1198930456

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