Competition law and public interests : principles for resolving conflicts and an application to the banking sector / Mart Kneepkens.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Kneepkens, Mart, author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Antitrust law--European Union countries.

Antitrust law.

Banking law--European Union countries.

Banking law.

Restraint of trade.

Restraint of trade--European Union countries.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (341 pages)

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

The Hague, The Netherlands : Eleven International Publishing, [2018]

Summary:

This book explores the relationship between competition law and public interests, with a specific focus on EU and Dutch competition laws as they apply to cartels and mergers. It proposes new frameworks for reconciling public interests with competition law, providing structured analysis and guidance on resolving conflicts. The book includes detailed explanations of current laws, case law, and practical applications, particularly in the banking sector. It is intended for lawyers, policymakers, practitioners, and academics interested in the intersection of competition law and public interests. Generated by AI.

Contents:

Intro

Table of Contents

Preface

Acknowledgements

Terminology

1 Introduction

1.1 Why This Book? An Introduction

1.2 The Central Questions

1.3 Application to the Banking Sector

1.4 Outline of This Book

2 The Goals of Competition Law

2.1 Introduction

2.2 The Rationales for Competition Law

2.2.1 The Theory of Economic Welfare

2.2.1.1 Economic Welfare as a Measure for Economic Prosperity

2.2.1.2 Determining the Size of the Consumer Surplus

2.2.1.3 Conceptual Difficulties with Determining the Consumer Surplus

2.2.1.4 Producer Surplus and Total Welfare

2.2.1.5 Society's Well-Being and Economic Welfare

2.2.2 The Harm of Imperfect Competition for Economic Welfare

2.2.2.1 Market Power

2.2.2.2 Innovation

2.2.3 The Economic Prosperity Rationale: Conclusion

2.3 The Goals of EU Antitrust Law

2.3.1 Introduction

2.3.2 The Goals of EU Antitrust Law: Economic Prosperity

2.3.2.1 EU Legislative History

2.3.2.2 The Commission's Policy

2.3.2.3 The EU Courts' Case Law

2.3.2.4 Conclusion on Economic Prosperity as a Goal of EU Antitrust Law

2.3.3 The Goals of EU Antitrust Law: Market Rivalry

2.3.3.1 Introduction

2.3.3.2 The Commission's Policy

2.3.3.3 The EU Courts' Case Law

2.3.3.4 Competition as a Form of Economic Freedom

2.3.3.5 Conclusion on Market Rivalry as a Goal of EU Competition Law

2.3.4 Economic Prosperity and Market Rivalry: A Normative View

2.3.5 The Goals of EU Antitrust Law: The Single Market Imperative

2.3.5.1 Introduction

2.3.5.2 The Hierarchy of the EU Treaties' Goals

2.3.5.3 The EU Courts' Case Law

2.3.5.4 Conclusion on the Single Market Imperative as a Goal of EU Competition Law

2.3.6 The Single Market Imperative: A Normative View

2.3.7 Goals of EU Antitrust Law: Other EU Policies.

2.3.8 A Legal Test for the Cartel Prohibition

2.3.8.1 The Need for a Definition of 'a Restriction of Competition'

2.3.8.2 The Two Screens Test

2.3.9 The Goals of EU Antitrust Law: Conclusion

2.4 The Goals of EU Merger Control

2.4.1 Introduction

2.4.2 The Goals of EU Merger Control: Economic Prosperity

2.4.2.1 Introduction

2.4.2.2 The Goal of the 1989 Merger Regulation: Market Rivalry

2.4.2.3 The EUMR Introduced the Efficiency Defence

2.4.2.4 The 'No Obstacle to Competition' Condition

2.4.2.5 Economic Prosperity as the Goal of EU Merger Control: Conclusion

2.4.3 The Goals of EU Merger Control: Single Market Imperative

2.4.4 The Goals of EU Merger Control: Other EU Public Policy Goals

2.4.5 The Goals of EU Merger Control: Conclusion

2.5 The Goals of Dutch Competition Law

2.5.1 Introduction

2.5.2 The Goals of Dutch Competition Law: Economic Prosperity

2.5.3 The Single Market Imperative and the DCA

2.5.4 The Goals of Dutch Competition Law: Other Dutch Public Policy Goals

2.5.5 The Goals of Dutch Competition Law: Conclusion

2.6 The Goals of Competition Law: Conclusion

3 The Goals of Banking Regulation

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Rationales for Market Regulation

3.2.1 Introduction

3.2.2 Efficiency Justifications

3.2.3 Non-Economic Justifications

3.2.4 Paternalism

3.3 The Role of Banks in Society

3.3.1 Introduction

3.3.2 Banks' Essential Tasks for Society

3.4 Competition as a Goal of Banking Regulation

3.5 Goals of Prudential Regulation

3.5.1 Goals of Prudential Regulation: Introduction

3.5.2 Goals of Prudential Regulation: Preventing the Failure of Individual Banks

3.5.2.1 Efficiency Justification: Remedying Banks' Inherent Instability

3.5.2.2 Non-Economic Justification: Protection against Grave Consequences of Bank Failures.

3.5.2.3 Conclusion on Prudential Regulation Regarding Individual Bank Failures

3.5.3 Goals of Prudential Regulation: Mitigating Systemic Risk

3.5.3.1 Introduction to Systemic Risk Regulation

3.5.3.2 Conclusion on Systemic Risk Regulation

3.5.4 Conclusion on the Goals of Prudential Regulation

3.6 Goals of Business Conduct Regulation

3.6.1 Goals of Business Conduct Regulation: Introduction

3.6.2 Goals of Business Conduct Regulation: Consumer Protection

3.6.2.1 Consumer Protection Law v. Competition Law

3.6.2.2 Paternalistic Regulation

3.6.2.3 Efficiency Justification: Information Issues

3.6.2.4 Non-Economic Justification: Protecting Consumers from Overindebtedness

3.6.2.5 Non-Economic Justification: Financial Inclusion

3.6.2.6 Non-Economic Justification: Privacy Protection

3.6.2.7 Conclusion on Consumer Protection Justifications

3.7 Goals of Banking Regulation: Conclusion

4 Economic v. Non-Economic Benefits - Article 101(3) TFEU - First Condition

4.1 Introduction

4.1.1 Introduction to this Chapter

4.1.2 Introduction to the Exemption Possibility and the Exemption Analytical Framework

4.2 Normative View on the First Condition

4.2.1 Introduction to the Normative View on the First Condition

4.2.2 Why All Economic Benefits Must Fall within the Scope of the First Condition

4.2.2.1 Economic Welfare as a SuitableCommonDenominator

4.2.2.2 The Need for Convincing Substantiation of Welfare Effects

4.2.2.3 Undertakings Benefit from Anti-Competitive Profits

4.2.2.4 Conclusion on the Normative View on Economic Benefits

4.2.3 Why Non-Economic Benefits Must Not Fall within the Scope of the First Condition

4.2.3.1 No Overarching Goal as a Common Denominator

4.2.3.2 Non-Economic Benefits and the Democratic Legitimacy Rule.

4.2.3.3 Competition Authorities and the Democratic Legitimacy Rule

4.2.3.4 The Courts and the Democratic Legitimacy Rule

4.2.3.5 Conclusion on the Normative View on Non-Economic Benefits

4.2.4 Paternalism and Economic Benefits

4.2.5 Integration Clauses and Non-Economic Benefits

4.2.5.1 The Use of the Integration Clauses

4.2.5.2 A Normative View on the Use of Integration Clauses

4.2.6 Conclusion on the Normative View on the First Condition

4.3 The Legal Status Quo of the First Condition

4.3.1 Introduction to the Legal Status Quo of the First Condition

4.3.2 The First Condition: EU Case Law

4.3.3 The First Condition: Commission Practice

4.3.4 The First Condition: ACM Practice

4.3.5 Synthesis: EU Courts and Authorities Do Not Provide a Proper Test for First Condition

4.3.6 Conclusion on the Legal Status Quo of the First Condition

4.4 The First Condition: Conclusion

5 Beneficiaries, Suitability and Innovation - Article 101(3) TFEU - Second, Third &amp

Fourth Condition

5.1 Introduction

5.2 The Second Condition of the Exemption Possibility

5.2.1 Introduction to the Second Condition

5.2.2 The Second Condition:ANormative View on the Beneficiaries of the Improvements

5.2.3 The Second Condition: A Normative View on the 'Fair Share' Requirement

5.2.4 Conclusion on the Normative View of the Second Condition

5.2.5 The Second Condition: The Legal Status Quo of the Beneficiaries of the Improvements

5.2.6 The Second Condition: The Legal Status Quo of the 'Fair Share' Requirement

5.2.7 Conclusion on the Legal Status Quo of the Second Condition

5.2.8 Final Conclusion on the Second Condition

5.3 The Third Condition of the Exemption Possibility

5.3.1 Introduction to the Third Condition

5.3.2 The Third Condition: A Normative View on Its Scope.

5.3.3 The Third Condition: The Legal Status Quo of Its Scope

5.3.4 The Third Condition: Comparison between the Normative View and Legal Status Quo

5.3.5 Conclusion on the Third Condition

5.4 The Fourth Condition of the Exemption Possibility

5.4.1 Introduction to the Fourth Condition

5.4.2 The Fourth Condition: A Normative View on Its Scope

5.4.3 The Fourth Condition: The Legal Status Quo of Its Scope

5.4.4 The Fourth Condition: Comparison between the Normative View and Legal Status Quo

5.4.5 Conclusion on the Fourth Condition

5.5 The Second, Third and Fourth Condition: Conclusion

6 Legitimate Objective Ancillarity

6.1 Introduction

6.2 The Legitimate Objective Ancillarity Doctrine: Legal Status Quo

6.2.1 Introduction to the Legal Status Quo

6.2.2 The Scope of 'Legitimate Objectives'

6.2.3 The Proportionality Test

6.2.4 Conclusion on the Legal Status Quo of Legitimate Objective Ancillarity Doctrine

6.3 Normative View on the Legitimate Objective Ancillarity Doctrine

6.3.1 Introduction to the Normative View

6.3.2 Legitimate Objective Ancillarity as an Internal Market Rule of Reason

6.3.3 Legitimate Objective Ancillarity Doctrine Needed for Government Instructions?

6.3.4 Economic Benefits within the Legitimate Objective Ancillarity Doctrine

6.3.5 Conclusion on the Normative View on the Legitimate Objective Ancillarity Doctrine

6.4 The Legitimate Objective Ancillarity Doctrine: Conclusion

7 Reconciliation Mechanisms for Merger Control

7.1 Introduction

7.2 Emergency Takeovers: The Benefits

7.2.1 Introduction to Emergency Takeovers

7.2.2 State Intervention and Nationalisations

7.2.3 Emergency Takeovers: Benefits for the State

7.2.3.1 State Benefit 1: Improvement of Ailing Bank's Business Model

7.2.3.2 State Benefit 2: Piggybacking on Acquirer's Strong Capital Base.

7.2.3.3 Other State Benefits.

Notes:

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

Part of the metadata in this record was created by AI, based on the text of the resource.

Description based on print version record.

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN:

9789462749429

9462749426

OCLC:

1379466763