Theoretical virtues in science : uncovering reality through theory / Samuel Schindler.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Schindler, Samuel, 1980- author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Science--Methodology.

Science.

Science--Philosophy.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xii, 249 pages) : digital, PDF file(s).

Place of Publication:

Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2018.

Summary:

What are the features of a good scientific theory? Samuel Schindler's book revisits this classical question in the philosophy of science and develops new answers to it. Theoretical virtues matter not only for choosing theories 'to work with', but also for what we are justified in believing: only if the theories we possess are good ones (qua virtues) can we be confident that our theories' claims about nature are actually correct. Recent debates have focussed rather narrowly on a theory's capacity to predict new phenomena successfully, but Schindler argues that the justification for this focus is thin. He discusses several other theory properties such as testability, accuracy, and consistency, and highlights the importance of simplicity and coherence. Using detailed historical case studies and careful philosophical analysis, Schindler challenges the received view of theoretical virtues and advances arguments for the view that science uncovers reality through theory.

Contents:

Cover; Half-title page; Title page; Copyright page; Dedication; Contents; List of Figures; Acknowledgements; Introduction; Chapter 1 Theoretical Virtues, Truth and the Argument from Simplicity; 1.1 Theoretical Virtues; 1.2 The Explanatory Defence of Realism and Its Criticisms; 1.3 Theoretical Virtues: Epistemic or Pragmatic?; 1.4 The First Virtuous Argument for Realism: The Argument from Simplicity; Chapter 2 Pessimism, Base Rates and the No-Virtue-Coincidence Argument; 2.1 The Pessimistic Meta-Induction and the Divide et Impera Move; 2.2 False Posits and Novel Success: What If?; 2.3 PMI versus PUA2.4 Broader Concerns: The Base-Rate Fallacy; 2.5 The Central Virtuous Argument for Realism: Virtue Convergence; 2.6 Conclusion; Chapter 3 Novel Success and Predictivism; 3.1 Worrall's Account of Use-Novelty: Weak and Strong; 3.2 Parameter Freedom and Local-Symptomatic Predictivism; 3.3 Non-Starters; 3.4 Deflationary Approaches and Comparative Novel Success; 3.5 Mendeleev's Periodic Table and the Prediction of Chemical Elements; 3.6 Conclusion: Novel Success and Nagging Popperian Intuitions; Chapter 4 Theoretical Fertility without Novel Success; 4.1 McMullinian Fertility and Nolan's Challenge; 4.2 The Bohr-Sommerfeld Model of the Atom; 4.3 An Objectionable Change; 4.4 Conclusion; Chapter 5 Ad Hoc Hypotheses and the Argument from Coherence; 5.1 Ad Hocness: The State of the Art; 5.2 A Coherentist Conception of Ad Hocness; 5.3 In-Depth Illustrations of the Coherentist Conception; 5.4 The Third Virtuous Argument for Realism: The Argument from Coherence; Chapter 6 Virtues as Confidence Boosters and the Argument from Choice; 6.1 The Negative View, the Dictatorship Condition, and Its Violation; 6.2 Historical Case Studies; 6.3 The Fourth Virtuous Argument for Realism: The Argument from Choice6.4 Objections; Chapter 7 Philosophy of Science by Historical Means; 7.1 Laudan's Naïve and Sophisticated Naturalism; 7.2 Rational Reconstruction; 7.3 Concept Clarification; Conclusion; Epilogue: The Demarcation Problem; Bibliography; Index.

Notes:

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 16 May 2018).

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

1-108-39505-8

1-108-38135-9

1-108-39709-3