Enhancing deterrence with supplemental nuclear capabilities.

Format:

Book

Government document

Contributor:

United States. Department of Defense, issuing body.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

United States--Military policy.

United States.

Nuclear warfare--Government policy--United States.

Nuclear warfare.

Nuclear weapons--Government policy--United States.

Nuclear weapons.

Deterrence (Strategy).

Military policy.

Nuclear warfare--Government policy.

Nuclear weapons--Government policy.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (1 page)

Place of Publication:

[Washington, D.C.] : Department of Defense, [2019].

Summary:

The U.S. nuclear deterrent must dissuade any adversary from mistakenly believing it can benefit from using nuclear weapons--even in a limited way--against the U.S. or its allies and partners. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review concluded that the U.S. must adapt its existing forces with two modest supplemental capabilities to ensure that Russia, China, and others do not perceive a gap in our regional deterrence posture. These supplemental capabilities do not require nuclear testing, do not violate arms control treaties, and do not lower the U.S. threshold for nuclear use--these capabilities are intended to raise Russia's nuclear threshold, not lower our own. They will address the imbalance in non-strategic nuclear weapons without matching Russia system for system and provide leverage for future arms control efforts.

Notes:

Description based on online resource; title from PDF caption (Defense, viewed April 4, 2019).

OCLC:

1091583421