The U.S. Army in the Iraq War / Joel D. Rayburn, Frank K. Sobchak, editors ; with Jeanne F. Godfroy, Matthew D. Morton, James S. Powell, Matthew M. Zais.

Format:

Book

Government document

Contributor:

Rayburn, Joel, 1969- editor.

Sobchak, Frank K., editor.

Godfroy, Jeanne F., contributor.

Morton, Matthew Darlington, 1968- contributor.

Powell, James Scott, 1970- contributor.

Zais, Matthew M., contributor.

Army War College (U.S.). Press, publisher.

Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute, publisher.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

United States. Army--History.

United States.

United States. Army.

Iraq War, 2003-2011.

Iraq War, 2003-2011--Campaigns.

Iraq--History--2003-.

Iraq.

Military campaigns.

Genre:

History.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (2 volumes) : color illustrations, color maps

Other Title:

United States Army in the Iraq War

Place of Publication:

Carlisle, PA : Strategic Studies Institute : U.S. Army War College Press, 2019.

Summary:

The Iraq War has been the costliest U.S. conflict since the Vietnam War. To date, few official studies have been conducted to review what happened, why it happened, and what lessons should be drawn. The U.S. Army in the Iraq War is the Army's initial operational level analysis of this conflict, written in narrative format, with assessments and lessons embedded throughout the work. This study reviews the conflict from a Landpower perspective and includes the contributions of coalition allies, the U.S. Marine Corps, and special operations forces. Presented principally from the point of view of the commanders in Baghdad, the narrative examines the interaction of the operational and strategic levels, as well as the creation of theater level strategy and its implementation at the tactical level. Volume 1 begins in the truce tent at Safwan Airfield in southern Iraq at the end of Operation DESERT STORM and briefly examines actions by U.S. and Iraqi forces during the interwar years. The narrative continues by examining the road to war, the initially successful invasion, and the rise of Iraqi insurgent groups before exploring the country's slide toward civil war. This volume concludes with a review of the decision by the George W. Bush administration to "surge" additional forces to Iraq, placing the conduct of the "surge" and its aftermath in the second volume.

Contents:

Volume 1. Invasion, insurgency, civil war, 2003-2006

Volume 2. Surge and withdrawal, 2007-2011.

Notes:

"January 2019."

Includes bibliographical references.

Online resource, PDF version; title from title page (SSI, viewed June 10, 2019).

Other Format:

Print version: U.S. Army in the Iraq War

OCLC:

1083220385