Critical infrastructure protection : CISA should improve priority setting, stakeholder involvement, and threat information sharing : report to congressional requesters.

Format:

Book

Government document

Author/Creator:

United States. Government Accountability Office, author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency--Rules and practice--Evaluation.

United States.

Emergency management--United States--Evaluation.

Emergency management.

Infrastructure (Economics)--Security measures--United States--Planning--Evaluation.

Infrastructure (Economics).

Public-private sector cooperation--United States.

Public-private sector cooperation.

Emergency management--Evaluation.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (iii, 54 pages) : color illustrations, color maps.

Other Title:

Critical infrastructure protection : Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency should improve priority setting, stakeholder involvement, and threat information sharing

CISA should improve priority setting, stakeholder involvement, and threat information sharing

Place of Publication:

Washington, DC : United States Government Accountability Office, 2022.

Summary:

The risk environment for critical infrastructure ranges from extreme weather events to physical and cybersecurity attacks. The majority of critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector, making it vital that the federal government work with the private sector, along with state, local, tribal, and territorial partners. CISA is the lead federal agency responsible for overseeing domestic critical infrastructure protection efforts. This report examines (1) the extent to which the National Critical Infrastructure Prioritization Program currently identifies and prioritizes nationally significant critical infrastructure, (2) CISA's development of the National Critical Functions framework, and (3) key services and information that CISA provides to mitigate critical infrastructure risks.

Contents:

Background.

CISA and critical infrastructure stakeholders do not find the NCIPP useful. Limited understanding of national critical functions framework may pose challenges.

CISA cyber services and threat information sharing lack regional focus.

Conclusions.

Recommendations for executive action.

Agency comments and our evaluation.

Appendices.

Notes:

"March 2022."

"GAO-22-104279."

Includes bibliographical references.

Description based on online resource, PDF version; title from cover (GAO, viewed on May 6, 2022).

OCLC:

1302059855