Combating nuclear smuggling : risk-informed covert assessments and oversight of corrective actions could strengthen capabilities at the border : report to congressional requesters.

Format:

Book

Government document

Author/Creator:

United States. Government Accountability Office, author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

U.S. Customs and Border Protection--Rules and practice--Evaluation.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

Smuggling--United States--Prevention.

Smuggling.

Radioactive substances--Detection--Evaluation.

Radioactive substances.

Border security--United States--Evaluation.

Border security.

Nuclear terrorism--United States--Prevention.

Nuclear terrorism.

Undercover operations--United States--Evaluation.

Undercover operations.

Nuclear terrorism--Prevention.

Smuggling--Prevention.

Undercover operations--Evaluation.

United States.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (iii, 39 pages) : color illustrations, color maps

Other Title:

Risk-informed covert assessments and oversight of corrective actions could strengthen capabilities at the border

GAO-14-826 nuclear/radiological covert operations

Place of Publication:

Washington, DC : United States Government Accountability Office, 2014.

Summary:

Preventing terrorists from smuggling nuclear or radiological materials into the United States is a top national priority. To address this threat, DHS has deployed radiation detection equipment and trained staff to use it. CBP conducts covert operations to test capabilities for detecting and interdicting nuclear and radiological materials at air, land, and sea ports of entry into the United States as well as checkpoints. GAO was asked to review CBP's covert testing operations. This report assesses the extent to which (1) CBP covert operations assess capabilities at air, land, and sea ports and checkpoints to detect and interdict nuclear and radiological material smuggled across the border and (2) CBP reports its covert operations results and provides oversight to ensure that corrective actions are implemented. GAO analyzed documents, such as test summaries, directives, and planning and guidance papers and interviewed DHS, CBP, and Domestic Nuclear Detection Office officials. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in July 2014. Information that DHS deemed sensitive has been redacted. GAO recommends that DHS inform priorities for covert operations by using an assessment of risk, determining time frames for reporting results, addressing barriers for meeting time frames, and developing a mechanism to track corrective actions.

Contents:

Background.

Covert operations provide limited assessments of capabilities to detect and interdict smuggled nuclear and radiological materials.

CPB could report more consistently on covert operation results and provide greater oversight of corrective actions.

Conclusions.

Recommendations for executive actions.

Agency comments.

Appendices.

Notes:

"September 2014."

"GAO-14-826."

Includes bibliographical references.

Description based on online resource, PDF version; title from cover (GAO, viewed on Sept. 14, 2022).

OCLC:

892964624