Suitability and security processes review : report to the President.

Format:

Book

Government document

Author/Creator:

United States. Office of Management and Budget, author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Employee screening--Government policy--United States.

Employee screening.

Security clearances--United States--Evaluation.

Security clearances.

Government contractors--United States.

Government contractors.

United States--Officials and employees.

United States.

Risk assessment--Government policy--United States.

Risk assessment.

National security--United States.

National security.

Employees.

Risk assessment--Government policy.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (29 pages) : color illustrations, color map

Edition:

Executive summary.

Place of Publication:

[Washington, D.C.] : [Office of Management and Budget], 2014.

Summary:

"In the Fall of 2013, the President directed the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to conduct a 120-day review of Federal employee suitability and contractor fitness determinations as well as security clearance procedures. This Review complimented related efforts of the Department of Defense (DoD) with respect to physical and personnel security and of the National Security Council (NSC) and OMB on access to and security of classified information. This work was carried out by the Suitability and Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council (PAC). Chaired by OMB's Deputy Director for Management, the PAC includes the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), in their respective roles as Security and Suitability Executive Agents (see Appendix A). The Senior Review Panel (hereafter referred to as the Panel), comprised of representatives from OMB, ODNI, OPM, DoD, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), as well as representatives from the NSC, drove an intensive interagency review to assess risks inherent in the current security, suitability, and credentialing processes and identify recommended solutions to safeguard our personnel and protect our nation's most sensitive information. The Review addressed suitability and security investigations for civilian, military, and contractor personnel. The same investigative and adjudicative standards apply to both Federal employees and contractors who receive clearances, as the work to protect our national security is no less critical when the work is performed by contractors. The Review also examined the work performed by each group in conducting these investigations. The current practice of utilizing contract investigators to collect relevant information is an appropriate practice and consistent with regulations, provided the necessary oversight, metrics, and controls are in place. Our recommendations include improvements in the areas of contractor oversight, accountability, and quality metrics going forward. This Report presents a set of recommendations that establish new priorities for reform, while accelerating efforts already underway. These priorities include improving access to relevant information, especially state and local law enforcement records, and accelerating the shift to a continuous evaluation model across government; improving risk management approaches to reduce vulnerabilities in our current processes, including reduction of the total number of clearance holders and the backlog of periodic reinvestigations; and improving enterprise operations, to include strengthening oversight and government-wide implementation efforts while effectively managing limited resources. As part of its ongoing responsibilities, the PAC will be accountable for driving these changes and holding agencies accountable for implementing approved recommendations. This Report first gives an overview of the current processes for conducting investigations and adjudications of all categories of personnel, and then summarizes the key conclusions and recommendations of the Panel, concluding with proposed next steps."--Page 1.

Contents:

Introduction

Overview of Current Processes

Role of Contractors in Current Processes

The National Industrial Security Program

Contractors as Investigative Service Providers

Key Conclusions and Recommendations

Section A. Increase the availability and quality of critical information to improve decision making

Conclusion A.1. Background investigations are missing critical information such as police reports of arrests

Recommendation A.1. Improve access to and availability of State and Local criminal records

Conclusion A.2. Reportable information often goes unreported

Recommendation A.2. Clarify and expand requirements for reporting actions and behavior of employees and contractors to support decisions on access to facilities, classified/sensitive information, and IT systems

Conclusion A.3. Investigations occur too infrequently, creating unnecessary gaps in coverage

Recommendation A.3. Accelerate the implementation of a standardized program of Continuous Evaluation (CE), ensure full integration with agency Insider Threat Programs, and reassess Periodic Reinvestigation intervals as appropriate

Conclusion A.4. Once implemented, the Revised 2012 Federal Investigative Standards (FIS) will significantly reduce gaps in current processes

Recommendation A.4. Accelerate implementation of elements of Revised Federal Investigative Standards (FIS) to address gaps identified in existing investigative processes

Section B. Reduce risks that are inherent in our current processes

Conclusion B.1. The current backlog of Periodic Reinvestigations

especially for our most sensitive populations

creates vulnerabilities

Recommendation B.1. Reduce Periodic Reinvestigation backlog using a risk-based approach

Conclusion B.2. Growth in the number of clearance-holders increases costs and exposes classified national security information, often at very sensitive levels, to an increasingly large population

Recommendation B.2. Reduce total population of 5.1M Secret and TS/SCI clearance holders to minimize risk of access to sensitive information and reduce cost

Conclusion B.3. Performance measures for investigation and adjudication quality are neither standardized nor implemented consistently

Recommendation B.3. Accelerate the development of quality standards and implementation of consistent measures and metrics for investigations and adjudications, and improve the quality of existing oversight mechanisms for Federal and contract investigators, and Federal adjudicators

Conclusion B.4. The current investigation and adjudication process frequently fails to detect false information supplied by applicants

Recommendation B.4. Improve detection of and response to applicant falsification in current processes

Conclusion B.5. Credentialing decisions that enable physical access to government facilities or IT systems are applied in an inconsistent way

Recommendation B.5. Establish new Government-wide adjudication requirements for credentials issued to include the currently optional OPM supplementary standards.

Conclusion B.6. The lack of clarity on whether or how to suspend credentials creates vulnerabilities to personnel-related threats

Recommendation B.6. Revise the Final Credentialing Standards to establish a suspension mechanism

Section C. Improve Enterprise Operations

Conclusion C.1. The Security and Suitability Performance Accountability Council needs a more active posture to achieve and sustain successful reforms

Recommendation C.1. Recompose the PAC to actively manage and oversee enterprise issues

Conclusion C.2. Greater focus is needed to develop enterprise-wide information technology capabilities

Recommendation C.2. Develop and execute enterprise Reform IT strategy to ensure interoperability, operationalize CE, automate suitability processes, and improve sharing of relevant information

Conclusion C.3. There is a lack of enterprise Security/Suitability/Credentialing process cost analysis, investment planning for major reform initiatives, and automated records collection capability to enable transition to needed end-to-end automated capabilities

Recommendation C.3. Establish mechanisms to manage and oversee government-wide spending for suitability and security processes

Implementation and Next Steps

Appendix A. Roles and Responsibilities

Appendix B. Five-Tiered Investigative Model

Appendix C. Denial of Criminal History Record Information by State (FY13 Data)

Appendix D. Increase in Investigative Costs Based on DoD Volume

Appendix E. Gap in Vetting Workplace Safety Issues.

Notes:

"February 2014."

Title from title screen (viewed Mar. 19, 2014).

Includes bibliographical references.

OCLC:

873928199